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Abstract—IOTA opened recently a new line of research in
distributed ledgers area by targeting algorithms that ensure a
high throughput for the transactions generated in IoT systems.
Transactions are continuously appended to an acyclic structure
called tangle and each new transaction selects as parents two
existing transactions (called tips) that it approves. G-IOTA, a
very recent improvement of IOTA, targets to protect tips left
behind offering hence a good confidence level. However, this
improvement had a cost: the use of an additional tip selection
mechanism which may be critical in IoT systems since it needs
additional energy consumption. In this paper we propose a new
metamorphic algorithm for tip selection that offers the best
guaranties of both IOTA and G-IOTA. Our contribution is two
fold. First, we propose a parameterized algorithm, E-IOTA, for
tip selection which targets to reduce the number of random
walks executed in previous versions (IOTA and G-IOTA) while
maintaining the same security guaranties as IOTA and the same
confidence level and fairness with respect to tips selection as
G-IOTA. Then we propose a formal analysis of the security
guaranties offered by E-IOTA against various attacks mentioned
in the original IOTA proposal (e.g. large weight attack, parasite
chain attack and splitting attack). Interestingly, to the best of
our knowledge this is the first formal analysis of the security
guaranties of IOTA and its derivatives.
Index Terms—IoT, Distributed ledgers, Tangle, Energy aware
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin blockchain technology created a new design philos-
ophy for executing and storing transactions in a decentralized
and secure fashion [1]. A blockchain is a distributed ledger
that mimics the functioning of a classical traditional ledger
(i.e. transparency and falsification-proof of documentation) in
an untrusted environment where the computation is distributed.
The set of participants to the system are not known and it
varies during the execution. Moreover, each participant follows
his own rules to maximize its welfare. Blockchain systems
maintain a continuously-growing list of ordered blocks that
include one or more transactions that have been verified by
the members of the system, called miners. Blocks are linked
using cryptography and the order of blocks in the blockchain
is the result of a form of agreement among the system
participants. Participants strongly agree only on a prefix of
the blockchain, the suffix of the blockchain may be different
from one participant to another.
Bitcoin technology and similar proposals (e.g Ethereum)
came with several drawbacks that prevent them from being
used as standard for IoT industry. In the field of IoT the main
attributes that are concerned are the speed, scalability, and
energy costs; all of which Bitcoin suffers from as limitations.
Hence the introduction of IOTA [2] designed specifically for
the IoT industry. IOTA is a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph)
based distributed ledger, also known as the tangle, aimed to
overcome limitations of Bitcoin when used in IoT environment
while preserving equivalent security levels. IOTA uses tip
selection algorithms for new transactions to approve two previ-
ous transactions. IOTA suffers from certain limitations in terms
of security and fairness with respect to approved transactions.
Therefore G-IOTA [3] was proposed as a new tips selection
mechanism that combines a confidence fairness aware tips
selection algorithm and a mutual supervision mechanism.
In this paper we introduce a new approach, E-IOTA, that
aims at maximizing the fairness level in tip selection by
approving left behind tips, and improving confidence within
the main tangle. E-IOTA randomizes tip selection to reduce
computational costs, as well as reduces left behind tips,
and increases the security level of the tangle by avoiding a
deterministic (predictable) tips selection algorithm (TSA). This
makes the TSA and the tangle unpredictable for attackers. The
algorithm creates a metamorphic main-chain that is as resistant
to splitting attacks as IOTA and G-IOTA while reducing the
costs of tip selection and hence preserving the energy of the
nodes maintaining the tangle.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II
introduces IOTA and G-IOTA and identifies their drawbacks.
Section III proposes E-IOTA that is designed to overcome
the drawbacks of both IOTA and G-IOTA tangles. Section
IV focuses on the security analysis of E-IOTA. Section V
discusses the process of evaluation and testing of E-IOTA and
provides the performance analysis and the comparison between
the IOTA, G-IOTA and E-IOTA tangles. Section VI concludes
the paper and discusses future research directions.
II. BACKGROUND ON IOTA AND G-IOTA
In this section we present the design details of the IOTA
system. Furthermore we focus its drawbacks and describe the
improvement G-IOTA and its drawbacks respectively.
A. Tangle
IOTA is a tangle-based distributed ledger. Unlike a standard
blockchain it is a DAG where transactions are appended once
verified. The genesis is the first and single transaction of the
tangle. In the beginning of the tangle, there is an address with
a balance that contained all of the tokens, in other words
the genesis contains all the tokens that would be later on
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Fig. 1: tangle example
distributed to the network. The genesis transaction sent these
tokens to several other founder addresses, addresses that are
owned by the original investors of the IOTA project.
The transaction of the label G in Figure 1 is the genesis
transaction of the tangle. The white boxes are approved trans-
actions and the gray boxes are the unapproved transactions or
tips. The tangle is characterized by its height (the length of the
longest oriented path to the genesis) and its depth (the length
of the longest reverse-oriented path to some tip). Each square
on the DAG in Figure 1 represents a transaction on the tangle
numbered from 1 to 14. When a transaction is generated in
the network, two previous transactions must be approved. This
approval is represented by arrows in Figure 1. To illustrate,
transaction 6 approves previous transaction(1) and transac-
tion(3), so that it can be considered to be a valid transaction.
Transactions can either directly or indirectly approve other
transactions. A direct arrow between two transactions, for
example transaction(6) and transaction(3), would be classed
as a direct approval. If there is no direct arrow, but there is a
path of lenght at least 2, as represented between transaction(9)
and transaction(3) for example, then transaction(9) would be
considered as an indirect approval of transaction(3). Newly
issued transactions with no approvals are called tips. In order
to best determine which two transactions to verify, IOTA uses
what is called a tip selection algorithm (TSA) which will be
further discussed in Section II-B.
B. TSA
The tip selection algorithm in IOTA tangle works on the
basis that every incoming transaction has to approve two old
transactions. In order to achieve that a walker is generated to
traverse the tangle in a direction opposite of the path vectors
based on a transition function until it reaches a tip. In the IOTA
white paper [2] it is stated that an N number of walkers are
generated with every incoming transaction and race towards
the tip, the first walker to reach a tip is the one to confirm
it. In this paper for simplicity the N number of walkers is
fixed to N = 1, where there is no race between walkers, but
rather one walker gets to traverse the path reaching a tip and
confirming it. Taking into account that two old transactions
need to be confirmed, therefore two walkers are generated
asynchronously to reach these two tips using tip selection
algorithms. IOTA’s tip selections are categorized as follows:
• UNIFORM RANDOM TSA The uniform random tip selec-
tion algorithm is the simplest to implement since it
chooses the two tips uniformly at random. The walker
chooses paths with equal probabilities until it reaches a
tip.
• LOGARITHMIC MARKOV CHAIN MONTE CARLO TSA
With this algorithm, the number of children is more
important than their weight [4].i.e. the TSA prioritizes
the chain with a higher number of children, rather than
that with a higher weight.
• WEIGHTED MARKOV CHAIN MONTE CARLO TSA This
represents the main focus and being the most secure
approach [5]. The details of this selections mechanism
are provided below.
The weight of a transaction is directly correlated with
the amount of work put in by a node in issuing it, for
simplicity it is assumed that the weight of the transaction
in this paper is fixed to 1. Transactions can also have what
is known as a cumulative weight. Cumulative weight is the
weight of a particular transaction plus the sum of the weights
of other transactions that directly or indirectly approve it,
for example in Figure 1 transaction(8) would be considered
to have a cumulative weight of itself plus the weights of
transaction(13), transaction(11), and transaction(12); hence the
cumulative weight of transaction(8) would be equal to 4.
The Weighted TSA starts by initially putting a fixed number
of walkers on the local DAG. Each walker performs a random
walk towards the tips of the DAG with a probabilistic transition
function that depends on the cumulative weight of the site it
is located to and its children. The more cumulative weight a
next transaction has, the higher probability the random walker
will go to it. Weighted Walk has a configurable parameter α to
control the effectiveness of the cumulative weight [2], it is a
parameter that determines the level of randomness the walker
undergoes while choosing paths between chains. With a high
α, even if the cumulative weights of two transactions have
a small difference, the transaction with a bigger cumulative
weight will have a higher probability to be chosen by the
random walk. On the other hand, if α is small, even if the
cumulative weights of two transactions have a big difference,
they have almost the same probability to be chosen by the
random walk.
C. Confidence
As a transaction receives additional approvals, its cumula-
tive weight respectively grows making it more eligible to be
chosen, hence within the tangle it is considered to have a high
level of confidence. This helps in providing a more secure
tangle by making it more difficult for the system to accept a
splitting attack. In a splitting attack, the attacker generates two
conflicting transactions attached to previous transactions.
It was stated in [2] that no rules are imposed for choosing
which transactions a transaction will approve. In order to issue
a transaction, a node that wants to insert a new transactions
does the following:
• the node chooses two other transactions to approve ac-
cording to a tip selection algorithm. In general, these two
transactions may coincide.
• The node checks if the two transactions are not conflict-
ing, and does not approve conflicting transactions.
• For a node to issue a valid transaction, the node must
solve a cryptographic puzzle similar to those in the
Bitcoin blockchain, in IOTA it is known as a proof-
of-work approach where each node has to contribute to
a small amount of work in the network by solving a
light cryptographic puzzle. This allows them to issue
transactions and add to the weight of the chain which
increases security to the network.
A conflicting transaction is when a node manages to pass the
same transaction twice in the chain, similar to a ”buy one get
one free” scenario where a client only pays for one item but
gets two in return. The tangle then splits the chain to discard
one of the conflicting transactions. Once the chain is split this
gives the attacker the chance to flood both chains with other
transactions keeping the weight of both chains balanced. This
creates two validation paths where each transaction resides,
and with this both transactions would be considered valid and
non-conflicting.
The main rule that the transactions use for deciding between
two conflicting transactions is the following: a node runs the
tip selection algorithm many times, and sees which of the
two transactions is more likely to be indirectly approved by
the selected tip. For example, if a transaction was selected 97
times during 100 runs of the tip selection algorithm, we say
that it is confirmed with 97% confidence [2].
D. Drawbacks
1) IOTA: IOTA suffers from a trade-off problem of having
a high α that leaves too many tips that do not receive confirma-
tion in the tangle, or a low α that makes the tangle susceptible
to attacks. As for left behind tips incoming transactions might
disregard older transactions and approve newer ones, this
taking into account lazy transactions that would approve closer
transactions to avoid getting involved in heavy computations.
This leaves many potential honest transactions forgotten and
unapproved in the tangle that would later on get truncated. The
best approach to reach all the tips in the tangle is by applying
a uniform random walk since each point in the tangle has
the same probability of being approved. This gets to question
security, since a splitting attack would be easier to execute
at that point, hence the need for the weighted MCMC walk.
That approach would execute on certain paths with higher
weights, and disregard other paths that might contain honest
tips which would end up getting truncated. IOTA in order to
achieve equilibria has to both be able to approve the majority
of the tips while maintaining the security of the tangle [5].
With a high value of α, we acquire more left behind tips, and
with a low value of α we acquire a more vulnerable tangle to
splitting attacks.
In terms of energy conservation and efficiency, a tangle of
which its TSA performs weighted walks of a high value of α
requires computation of the weights of each path in the chain;
this would require higher energy in the tangle that would deem
the tangle not too suitable for IoT transactions. This interferes
with the concept of speed and energy efficiency on the scale
of thousands of micro-transactions per second.
In terms of security the types of mitigation that IOTA
implements to delude any types of malicious transactions
entering the network require transactions being able to follow
the path of the longest weighting chain. The more honest
transactions the chain contains the higher the probability that
they would approve other honest transactions. In order to
achieve that the tip selection algorithm has to maintain a high
α that would be able to distinguish between the weights of
chains and pick the chain with the higher weight since it
represents a higher confidence. An attacker in order to achieve
a splitting attack would require splitting the chain at a certain
time instant and maintaining the balance between the two
chains with the probabilistic Uniform Random walk, since a
transaction has the same probability on traversing on either
side of the chain. In the studies of Bramas [4], an IOTA
tangle is susceptible to a splitting attack regardless of its
TSA with the argument that later on a TSA would become
deterministic, which refutes the reliability of the weighted tip
selection algorithm.
2) G-IOTA: G-IOTA allows honest transactions in a tangle
to increase their confidences evenly and quickly to meet the
requirement of high confidence fairness [3]. Implicitly, this
way, no honest tips and transactions will be left behind during
the growth of the tangle. Transactions with low confidence for
a relatively long time can be considered as fake transactions.
G-IOTA is based on the weighted MCMC TSA. In addition,
a Left-behind Tips Protection mechanism is integrated that
allows tips that have been left behind regain the opportunity
to be approved by incoming tips, which further decreases
the transactions left behind. The new tips selection algorithm
chooses not only two tips as the classical IOTA but may choose
an additional tip, which is a left-behind tip in the tangle.
That allows increasing the fairness in terms of transaction
confidence for all honest transactions in tangle and guarantees
the first approval for all honest tips.
Although the approach of G-IOTA tackles the issue of left
behind tips that IOTA faces, the implementation of a third tip
selection algorithm makes a transaction take more time and
require more computation to reach approval in the tangle. This
approach deviates from the purpose of an IoT based crypto-
currency since it defies speed and energy efficiency more than
that of the original IOTA.
III. E-IOTA DETAILED DESCRIPTION
This paper proposes E-IOTA a new approach for tackling
left behind tips and maintaining high confidence levels in
the tangle, see Algorithm 1. E-IOTA has as input three tip
selection algorithms. Only one of these tip selection algorithms
gets chosen randomly by a node with a certain probability each
time it has to issue a transaction and a walker is generated.
This would maintain balance in keeping a low α for tip
confirmation, and high α in phases to contribute to the longest
main chain which mitigates attacks. Tip selection algorithms
input of E-IOTA are as follows:
Algorithm 1 E-IOTA executed by a node ni
%Two specific parameters for the algorithm are p1 and p2, such that 0 <
p1 < p2 < 1; N is a natural number.
%Each time when a node ni needs to chose a tip from the local tangle as
the parent of its new transaction, it draws a random number r ∈ [0, 1).
if r < p1 then
ni generates N uniform unweighted random walkers as TSA.
else if p1 ≤ r < p2 then
ni generates N weighted random walkers as TSA with a low α value.
else if p2 ≤ r < 1 then
ni generates N weighted random walkers as TSA with a high α value.
1) Weighted walks a relatively high α, with probability (1−
p2), making it very probable for the walk to go in the path
of the weighted chain.
Pros: limits the probability of an attacker being able to
accomplish a successful splitting attack.
2) Weighted walks of a median α, with probability (p2−p1)
to lower the probability of going through a more highly
weighted chain but rather give chance to confirm tips on
other chains.
Pros: Changes the main chain direction to deviate from a
deterministic path and eliminate an attacker’s predictabil-
ity of the tangle.
3) Uniform random walks (α = 0) with probability p1 to
roam to all sub-tangles and approve any left behind tips.
Pros: Requires low computation where paths are proba-
bilistically equal, this approach reduces computation de-
mand in the tangle. It also maintains a high confirmation
rate in the tangle by being able to explore all unapproved
transactions.
where 0 < p1 < p2 < 1.
E-IOTA reduces the need for the third walk proposed by
G-IOTA, tackles the problem of left behind tips in IOTA,
and reduces energy and computational power in the tangle
making it more efficient. Section V describe the numerical
results while running E-IOTA with specific values for p1 and
p2.
IV. E-IOTA SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we give a formal security analysis of E-IOTA.
We look into all three mentioned attacks in the white paper
of IOTA [2]: Large Weight Attack, Parasite Chain Attack and
Splitting Attack. We prove that our fairness and effectiveness
aware E-IOTA resists all of mentioned attacks.
A. E-IOTA modelling
According to the description of E-IOTA in section III, we
define a model. We assume that the total average honest
transaction rate is λ, that means that in a given time interval
between [t0, t0+ τ ], λ transactions sent by honest users in the
system will be in the tangle. For all λ transactions that entered
during [t0, t0+ τ ], 2λ approvals are added into the tangle and
approve old transactions already in the tangle. Among all these
approvals, we can distinguish them into three classes:
1) p0 percentage of them are chosen by Uniform Random
Walks TSA, where α = 0 i.e. all possible next hops have
equal probabilities to be chosen by random walkers. To
simplify, we assume that all the tips will be chosen as parents
by new coming tips with equal probability.
2) pL percentage of them are chosen by Weighted Random
Walks TSA with a relatively low random α, denoted by αL.
With αL, random walkers will more likely to go to the next
hop having higher cumulative weight, but others hops with
less cumulative weight still have chance to be chosen.
3) pH percentage of them are chosen by Weighted Random
Walks TSA with a high α, denoted by αH . With αH , random
walkers go the next hops with the highest cumulative weight,
with high probability.
Following the above classes, we consider that the TSA in
E-IOTA is a combination of these three TSAs. The quantity of
incoming approvals during a period of time, A, therefore con-
sists of three types of approvals: A0, approvals comming from
tips chosen by unweighted random walks; AL, computed from
weighted walks with αL, and AH computed from weighted
walks with αH . We assume that approvals sent come to the
network during time interval [t0, t0 + τ ], will appear into the
tangle in the time interval [t0+ τ, t0+2τ ] due to the network
delay. Approvals come during the [t0, t0+τ ] therefore will not
affect each other, because they are not yet in the tangle. Each
type of approval comes into the tangle therefore independently
and only depends on the tangle in time t0. According to the
percentages of three TSAs, the A can be defined as:
A = p0 ×A0 + pL ×AL + pH ×AH (1)
By defining A we proceed to analyse the three attacks.
B. Large Weight Attack
Description and Aim A large weight attack, shown in
Figure 2, occurs when an attacker tries to generate a ”heavy”
transaction, j, which conflicts with that of a previous trans-
action i, taking into account transaction i has already been
approved by several transactions and is considered as con-
firmed. That means money in i is spent successfully. These two
conflicting transactions do not belong to the same verification
path. In this way an honest new coming transaction would not
be able to approve both of them simultaneously. The attacker
hopes that among new coming A, more approvals will approve
j than i in the future, so the users will consider that j is the
correct transaction rather than i, so that the attacker can reuse
the same money one more time, known as double spending.
Assumption In this case, we assume that i has more ap-
provals than j at the beginning of the attack, as the transaction
j is just published onto the tangle and has not received any
approval yet. Also we assume that i has at least more than
one tips approving it, because i was already in the tangle for
a while and received several approvals. Implicitly, i has higher
cumulative weigh than j.
We also take the assumption from the white paper of IOTA
[2] by limiting the maximal weight for any transaction. So that
all transactions will have the same ”heaviness”. That means
the attacker can only publish his transaction with the maximal
Fig. 2: Large Weight Attack
Fig. 3: Parasite Chain Attack
allowing weight as same as others instead of sending a super
”heavy” priority transaction.
Proof For the A0, they will more likely approve i rather
than j, as i has more tips approving it than j and each tips has
equal probability to be chosen. Also as i has higher cumulative
weight than j, most of AL and AH will therefore approve i
rather than j. Therefore, in this case, all of the three types of
A, will more likely to approve i and to continue increasing the
cumulative weight of i. That means, as time passes attacker’s
transaction j has no chance to have more approvals than i.
Hence the large weight attack will not work in E-IOTA.
C. Parasite Chain Attack
Description and Aim Parasite chain attack scenario is
shown in Figure 3. An attacker generates a sub-tangle (also
called parasite chain) offline secretly. We indicate a transac-
tion j at the very beginning of this sub-tangle. j approves
transactions on the main tangle. After a time T , the attacker
publishes a transaction i into the main tangle conflicting with
the transaction j in the sub-tangle. The attacker continues
working on the sub-tangle offline for a while making sure
that the sub-tangle has as many as possible available tips to
be chosen by random walkers. At the same time, i may get
several approvals in the main tangle and is confirmed (money
spent). Then the attacker publishes his secret chain online and
hopes that the more approvals in A will approve j than i in
the future to launch the double spending.
Assumption In this case, we assume that the computational
power of the attacker is smaller than that of the honest users
spent for publishing transactions. We also assume that the
Fig. 4: Splitting Attack
transactions approving j in the sub-tangle are far more than
that for i as to show the worst case scenario present in [4].
Because although the computational power of honest users
is higher than that of the attacker, it does not imply that all
approvals from honest users will approve i, whereas on the
other hand, all the computational power of the attacker will
be used to generate approvals for j.
And also, we assume that all the transactions have the same
weight.
Proof As j has more available tips, A0 will more likely
approve j than i. In the worst case, we assume that i does not
receive any approval from A0 with high probability. Hence
most part of A0 will approve j. However, as the computational
power of the attacker is smaller than that of all honest users,
the cumulative weight of sub-tangle published into the main
tangle can not be higher than that of the main tangle after
the time T . All the AH will therefore approve the main
tangle, rather than the sub-tangle with a high probability. This
implies that AH will not approve j. As long as the main
tangle maintains a higher cumulative weight after the attacker
attaches the sub-tangle, the new approvals from AH and AL
will continue to contribute to the main tangle rather than
the sub-tangle. Therefore, as long as pL + pH > p0, which
means the percentage of weighted walkers is higher than that
of the unweighted random walkers, we can make sure that
the majority of approvals contribute to the main tangle. i will
always receive more approve than j.
Hence the parasite chain attack will not work in E-IOTA as
long as pL + pH > p0.
D. Splitting Attack
Description and Aim In the splitting attack, shown in
Figure 4, an attacker will try to keep the balance of cumu-
lative weights between conflicting branches. The conflicting
branches can be generated by publishing two conflicting
transactions, so that incoming transactions can only approve
one of them. An attacker tries to maintain balance between
the conflicting branches by publishing transactions to both
branches while keeping them of almost similar weight. In this
case the attacker will be able spend the same money in both
conflicting branches.
Assumption We assume that the computational power of
the attacker is pa% of the total power of all the honest users
p spent for publishing transactions. And for this scenario, we
assume that a splitting attack succeeds if the attacker has at
least the same computational power as that of the computa-
tional power difference between honest users approving these
two branches. Hence the attacker has to maintain the balance
between the branches, in order to do so the attacker publishes
his transactions to the branch that most of honest users won’t
approve, and hope that he can generate more approvals to keep
the balance of cumulative weight between these two branches.
And also, we assume that all the transactions have the same
weight.
Proof The key problem represents itself in what is the
maximal allowed pa% an attacker can have, so that E-IOTA
can still mitigate the splitting attack. We know that among the
A, pH of them will go to the branch with higher cumulative
weight with high probability. We can therefore say that if
pH > pa then, no matter how hard the attacker tries, he can
not generate more transactions for the branch with the lower
cumulative weight, than the transactions generated by honest
users towards the branch with the higher cumulative weight.
This creates a significant difference between the weights of
the branches with the weight of the branch that retains to
the honest users remaining greater than that generated by the
attacker. Hence, even approvals from AL are most likely to
approve the heavier branch. The attacker therefore can not
keep the balance between these two blanches.
The splitting attack therefore can not succeed as long as the
pH > Pa.
Note that to resist the lazy or cheating user mentioned in
white paper [2], a Mutual Supervision mechanism proposed in
G-IOTA [3], can be added to E-IOTA to solve the problem.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Performance Evaluation Settings
The main focus of this study is the comparison and analysis
of IOTA, G-IOTA, and E-IOTA respectively. In the following
we consider the same parameters as proposed for the evalua-
tion of IOTA in [6]:
• IOTA running on a weighted MCMC TSA with α = 5
• G-IOTA running on a weighted MCMC TSA of α = 5
• VISA transaction network can process 2000tps [7]; There-
fore the three tangles were modeled to generate 2000tps
reaching 8000 transactions.
For the E-IOTA algorithm described in Section III the tips
selections run with the following values for the parameters
(these parameters show the best results for E-IOTA):
1) Weighted walks with α = 5 at probability p = 0.35,
making it very probable for the walk to go in the path
of the weighted chain. We recall that this limits the
probability of an attacker being able to accomplish a
successful splitting attack.
2) Weighted walks of a median α of random value between
0.1 and 2 to lower the probability of going through a more
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Fig. 5: Number of approved transactions
highly weighted chain but rather give chance to confirm
tips on other chains. This eliminates the eventuality for
an attacker to predict the tangle.
3) Uniform random walks of α = 0 with probability p = 0.1
to roam to all sub-tangles and approve any left behind
tips.
The three tangles (IOTA, G-IOTA and E-IOTA) are evalu-
ated using the following metrics:
• Number of approved transactions
• Number of tips
• Confidence levels above 95%
• Number of Walks needed to reach the number of approved
transactions
• Simulation Speed
In our experiments clients run node.js v10.15.3 on Fedora
29 (x86-64) to generate the tangles IOTA, G-IOTA, E-IOTA re-
spectively. We ran the experiments on three identical physical
machines each using a different tangle, each machine equipped
with:
• Quad Core model: Intel Core i7-2600 processors running
at 3.40 GHZ
• Intel corporation 2nd generation Core processor Family
integrated Graphics Controller
• 8 GB RAM
The approach of having three identical machines is to
be as unbiased as possible with the experimentation. This
would assure that the three tangles are equally given the same
computational power, and speed without giving the advantage
to any. Calculating confidence between conflicting transactions
would suggest running the random walk several times to
determine the higher confidence between these transactions,
and each transaction weight is given a fixed value of 1.
B. Performance Evaluation Results
The simulations for IOTA, G-IOTA, and E-IOTA were run
5 times respectively and the averaged results were taken.
In the following we analyze the results of the experiment on
the tangles of IOTA, G-IOTA, and E-IOTA. The high number
of tips is to be taken into account that with a speed of 2,000tps
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reaching 8,000 transactions the last 2,000 transactions are most
likely to be regarded as not approved yet in all three tangles.
Therefore are considered as tips that managed to enter the
network last. The analysis manages to differentiate between
IOTA, G-IOTA, and E-IOTA respectively based on the number
of approved transactions, the number of left behind tips, the
needed walks to reach theses approved transactions, the needed
computation, and the time elapsed for each tangle to reach
IOTA G-IOTA E-IOTA
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
·104
15,998 15,998
14,399
w
al
ks
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these results.
1) Number of approved transactions: In this section we
compare the number of approved transactions for each tangle.
Figure 5 presents the number of approved transactions for
the three tangles. The number of approved transactions for E-
IOTA presents the highest value of 4,177 approved transactions
whereas IOTA has only 1,865. The main reason as to why
IOTA has a low approval value is due to the α value of 5.
That would require walkers in the tangle to almost certainly
go through the same paths disregarding other paths that contain
transactions that have not been confirmed yet. In E-IOTA the
option of exploring other paths exists which shows with the
high number of approved transactions.
2) Number of tips: The number of tips as shown in Figure
6 represents the lowest number of left behind retaining to E-
IOTA 3,823 whereas the highest to IOTA of value 6,135. This
is similar to the previous section as to due to the α value of
5 in IOTA a lot of transactions are not explored and end up
becoming left behind. The probabilistic tip selection algorithm
in E-IOTA with α = 0 or even the values between 0.1 and
2, gets to reduce this problem by traversing different paths
and confirming the tips resulting in a low value of tips with
E-IOTA.
3) High confidence levels: With respect to confidence levels
higher than 95% the values in Figure 7 show almost equal
confidence levels for all three tangles. This represents a
positive outlook on the aspect of security for maintaining high
values of α to be able to mitigate splitting attacks. E-IOTA
produces an α = 5 at a probability of 0.35, which helps it
remain to preserve equal confidence levels in the tangle as
compared to IOTA and G-IOTA.
4) Number of Walks needed to reach the number of ap-
proved transactions: The number of walks in the experiment
represents the needed number of walks it took to reach the
number of confirmed tips in IOTA, G-IOTA, and E-IOTA
respectively.
Figure 8 represents the number of walks of each of the
tangles. The three tangles get to produce an equal number
of walks of value 15,998. Comparing with figure 5, IOTA
managed to get 1,865 approvals ,G-IOTA managed to get
3,836 approvals, and E-IOTA managed to get 4,1177 approvals
with these 15,998 walks. Figure 9 represents the number of
walks that required computation of the weight of the tangle
to reach these results of transaction approval. G-IOTA due
to the fact that it manages to choose the third tip randomly,
resulted in having equal values as that of IOTA at 15,998
instances the weight of the tangle was computed respectively
with the number of walkers deployed. E-IOTA on the other
hand only required 14,399 computations on the weight of the
tangle due to the fact that some walkers are generated to follow
the Uniform tip selection algorithm, which requires no need
for the computation of the weight of the tangle. This represents
a less need for walks to approve tips in the tangle and less
computation for E-IOTA.
5) Simulation Speed: The speed of the experiment plays an
important role in IoT micro transactions, the faster the ability
to reach a certain point in time, (8,000 transactions in this
experiment) is a necessary measurement in this experiment
to remain on the context of an IoT based DAG. Figure 10
shows that the least time needed to reach 8,000 transactions
was that of E-IOTA with a time of 87 minutes, whereas IOTA
came later with 92 minutes, and G-IOTA at 130 minutes. The
fact is that IOTA requires a computation of the weight of
the tangle each time a walker is deployed consume time. G-
IOTA similarly has to do the same but with the added third tip
selection which lead to it being the slowest. E-IOTA manages
to do so with occasional computation which explains as to
why the simulation time for E-IOTA was smaller than that of
IOTA, and G-IOTA.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In this paper we proposed E-IOTA which acts as a metamor-
phic tip selection algorithm that takes the advantages of each
tip selection algorithm designed previously for IOTA or G-
IOTA and runs them probabilistically in the tangle to overcome
the drawbacks of both IOTA and G-IOTA. E-IOTA brings into
attention the advantages of metamorphic, self-adjusting tan-
gles with respect to previous mono-strategy approaches. Our
simulation results show that E-IOTA maintains a significant
edge over IOTA and G-IOTA with respect to its performances,
while maintaining equal level of confidence and security. E-
IOTA manages to tackle the problem of left behind tips that
IOTA faces, it also manages to reduce computational energy,
and approve more transactions. It manages to maintain the
same security levels of that of IOTA and G-IOTA by using
probabilistic tip selection mechanisms.
Future research focuses on incorporating game theory, and
establishing a self-aware tangle capable of punishing and
rewarding nodes based on performance and contribution to
the tangle growth. The incorporation of game theory would
bring more room to adding functionalities within the TSA. As
long as the tangle is self-aware, it would adjust its structure
based on its own detection of rising malicious activity in the
tangle. Mechanism design techniques can be used in order to
punish attackers that would behave maliciously. A malicious
transaction would have to play fair or get truncated. Another
direction to be explored is to run machine learning algorithms
within the tangle in order to make it more self-aware.
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